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Criminal Law
By GERALD G. ASHDOWN*
INTRODUCTION
The Kentucky Court of Appeals reviews a significant num-
ber of relatively frivolous criminal appeals due to the auto-
matic right of appeal in criminal cases in which the defendant
receives a sentence of 12 months or more.' Consequently, the
issues raised on appeal in most Kentucky criminal cases are of
little interest or consequence. There are, however, two excep-
tions to this generalization among the cases heard by the Court
of Appeals during the past survey year: One case dealing with
obscenity2 and another with the defense of intoxication.3 The
obscenity decision is of interest because it implements the
guidelines enumerated in Miller v. California,4 the most recent
Supreme Court obscenity decision, while the case dealing with
intoxication is of significance because of the relatively unique
nature of the intoxication defense which it applies.
I. OBSCENITY
In order to adequately understand and appreciate the
Court of Appeals' handling of the obscenity issues raised in
Keene v. Commonwealth,- a discussion of Miller v. California'
is necessary. In Miller the Supreme Court of the United States
altered the definition of obscenity which had prevailed since
1966.1 A majority of the Court was finally able to agree' that:
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. B.B.A. 1969, J.D. 1972,
University of Iowa.
Ky. REV. STAT. § 21.140(1) (1971) [hereinafter cited as KRS].
2 Keene v. Commonwealth, 516 S.W.2d 852 (Ky. 1974).
3 Richards v. Commonwealth, 517 S.W.2d 237 (Ky. 1974).
413 U.S. 15 (1973).
516 S.W.2d 852 (Ky. 1974).
413 U.S. 15 (1973).
2 See Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966), in which the Supreme
Court, citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), defined obscenity in the
following terms:
"... whether to the average person, applying contemporary community
standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to
the prurient interest." Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. at 489. Under this
definition, as elaborated in subsequent cases, three elements must coalesce:
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The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a)
whether the "average person applying contemporary com-
munity standards" would find that the work, taken as a
whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work
depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual con-
duct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c)
whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value
The Miller decision made the following basic changes in the
Court's conception of obscenity:1" (1) The contemporary com-
munity standards to be applied are, or at least under the first
amendment can be, local community standards, instead of the
former national standards;" (2) to avoid due process-vagueness
problems, the state obscenity statute must specifically define
the prohibited depiction or description of sexual conduct; and
(3) the work only has to lack "serious" social value, as opposed
to being "utterly without redeeming social value."'' 2 Keene v.
it must be established that (a) the dominant theme of the material taken as
a whole appeals to a prurient interest in sex; (b) the material is patently
offensive because it affronts contemporary community standards relating to
the description or representation of sexual matters; and (c) the material is
utterly without redeeming social value.
383 U.S. at 418.
The former decisions defining obscenity were plurality opinions.
413 U.S. at 24 (citations omitted).
,0 Here I use the phrase "the Court's conception of obscenity" because there are
those who believe that the Court's view that some material is left unprotected by the
first amendment is inconsistent with the constitutional guarantees of freedom of
speech and press. It is argued that the freedom of speech and press are absolute,
leaving all published material free to seek it's own level in the marketplace. According
to this view, legal regulation is both contrary to the first amendment and unnecessary,
since undesirable and offensive material will be eliminated from the market by a lack
of consumer demand. See, e.g., Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 70-73
(1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting); United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S.
363, 379-80 (1971) (Black, J., joined by Douglas, J., dissenting); Ginzburg v. United
States, 383 U.S. 463, 476, 491 (1966) (Black, J., and Douglas, J., dissenting); Jacobellis
v. Ohio 378 U.S. 184, 196 (1964) (Black, J., joined by Douglas, J., concurring); Roth
v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 508-14 (1957) (Douglas, J., Jissenting).
" This is not indicated by the Court's definition, but see subdivision III of the
Court's opinion, 413 U.S. at 30-34, where it states that it would be unrealistic, and
constitutionally unnecessary, to require juries to apply some abstract national stan-
dard, given the diversity in tastes and attitudes in different parts of the country, and
concludes that in answering the question in part (a) of the Court's definition, juries
can be instructed to apply their own "local community standards."
12 See note 7 supra.
[Vol. 64
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Commonwealth involves the first two of these changes, as well
as the additional issue of how an allegedly obscene motion
picture can be constitutionally seized under the fourth amend-
ment.
A. Vagueness
The Supreme Court's decision in Miller dealt with the due
process problem of statutory vagueness by requiring that state
obscenity statutes specifically define the prohibited depiction
of sexual conduct. In Keene, which was an appeal from the
conviction of an assistant manager of a Louisville theater for
exhibiting an obscene motion picture, the appellant argued
that the Kentucky obscenity statute in effect at the time of his
arrest and trial 3 not only was overbroad but also failed to de-
fine specifically the prohibited depiction of sexual conduct, as
required by the majority opinion in Miller. Additionally, the
appellant asserted that the Court of Appeals' earlier determi-
nation in Hall v. Commonwealth4 that the statute was consis-
tent with Miller was inapplicable, since it was announced after
his arrest and conviction; to hold the judicial construction of
the statute in Hall applicable, he argued, would constitute ex
post facto lawmaking. The Court responded by stating that the
present film was the kind of "hard core" pornography which,
even prior to Hall, had consistently been held to be proscribed
by the statute.'5 The Court also noted that the same argument
had been rejected by the Supreme Court in Hamling v. United
States."5
11 See Ky. Aers ch. 40, §§ 1-9 (1966), as amended KRS § 531.010 (1975).
" 505 S.W.2d 166 (Ky. 1974).
The film was titled "Sophie Said No." It consisted of scenes of heterosexual
masturbation, fellatio and intercourse with the camera focused on the genitals. It
included scenes of ejaculation by the male partner upon the face of the female fellator.
The "story line" appeared to be that a successful commercial venture could consist of
the collection and sale of seminal fluid as a cosmetic for women's facial complexions.
11 418 U.S. 87 (1974). In Hamling, the petitioners argued that their prosecution
for mailing obscene material under 18 U.S.C. § 1461 was constitutionally impermissi-
ble because both on its face and as construed this statute did not apply to the specific
types of sexual conduct referred to in Miller v. California, and therefore the statute
was unconstitutionally vague as applied to them. In construing 18 U.S.C. § 1461 as
limited to the representations of specific "hard core" sexual conduct given as examples
in Miller, the Supreme Court held that statutory precision for prosecutions prior to
Miller was not required, and that petitioner's vagueness claim could not be sustained,
1975]
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Vagueness should no longer be a problem in Kentucky
because the new Kentucky Penal Code, which went into effect
January 1, 1975, contains an obscenity provision 7 that is vir-
tually identical to the Supreme Court's definiton in Miller.'
Furthermore, the statute contains a specific definition, as re-
quired by Miller,'9 of the type of sexual conduct which cannot
lawfully be depicted or described."
B. Contemporary Community Standards
Although the Supreme Court indicated in Miller that local
community standards, instead of national standards, could
constitutionally be employed in determining what constitutes
obscenity,2' it failed to indicate precisely how local community
since the mailed matter was in the category of "hard core" pornography for which the
statute conveyed "sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when
measured by common understanding and practices." 418 U.S. at 110-15.
17 KRS § 531.010(3).
' See text accompanying note 9 supra.
" See Part (b) of the Supreme Court's definition of obscenity in Miller v.
California, in text accompanying note 9 supra.
2 KRS § 531.010(4) provides:
"Sexual conduct" means act of masturbation, homosexuality, lesbian-
ism, bestiality, sexual intercourse, or deviant sexual intercourse; or physical
contact with the genitals, flagellation, or excretion for the purpose of sexual
stimulation or gratification.
Compare this statutory definition with the examples of permissible statutory defini-
tions given in Miller:
(a) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of ultimate sexual acts,
normal or perverted, actual or simulated. (b) Patently offensive representa-
tion or descriptions of masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibi-
tion of the genitals.
413 U.S. at 25. Note that the phrase "patently offensive" is included in the definition
of obscenity under KRS § 531.010(3)(b).
1, 413 U.S. at 30-31. It can be effectively argued that the application of "local"
community standards itself violates the first amendment because of the chilling effect
such standards have on distribution of ideas and materials. A determination of obscen-
ity based on "local" community standards will inevitably have the effect of preventing
dissemination of materials in some places because sellers will be unwilling to risk
criminal conviction by testing variations in standards from place to place. Thus, na-
tional distributors will retreat to debilitating self-censorship which abridges the first
amendment. See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 142-45 (1974)(Brennan, J.,
joined by Stewart, J. and Marshall, J., dissenting); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184,
193-95 (1964) (opinion of Brennan, J., joined by Goldberg, J.).
It is no answer to the foregoing argument to say that the same result theoretically
could occur under an application of national standards, since a national distributor
handcuffed by national standards would be deterred from sending his material to more
KENTUCKY LAW SURVEY
standards are to be established. However, it is clear from later
decisions that the determination and application of com-
munity standards are exclusively within the province of the
jury.22 In Hamling v. United States23 the Supreme Court articu-
lated this view in the following language:
A juror is entitled to draw on his own knowledge of the views
of the average person in the community or vicinage from
which he comes for making the required determination, just
as he is entitled to draw on his knowledge of the propensities
of a "reasonable" person in other areas of the law.21
This statement, coupled with the Supreme Court's holdings in
Hamling2" and Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton26 that as a mat-
ter of constitutional law the prosecution need not produce
"expert" witnesses to testify concerning the obscenity of the
materials in issue, leaves no doubt that the determination of
obscenity is to be based on the jury's own concept of "contem-
porary community standards.
'27
liberal parts of the country. See Miller v. United States, 413 U.S. at 32, n.13; Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. at 506. The point here is that the most liberal parts of the
country in relation to sexual permissiveness were, in fact, setting the national standard
under a strict and narrow definition of obscenity (Roth-Memoirs) with the result that
virtually nothing was held obscene which did not involve either distribution to minors,
pandering or importation. See the per curiam opinion in Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S.
767 (1967); cf. Burgin v. South Carolina, 404 U.S. 806 (1971); California v. Pinkus, 400
U.S. 922 (1970); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964). Thus, distributors were free
to disseminate material everywhere without much fear of an obscenity conviction. And
there is no reason to suppose that the liberal cultural centers would not continue to
set the standards under a broad definition of obscenity, such as was formulated in
Miller. That is to say, if national standards were still applicable, the only effect Miller
would have would be to increase the possibility of an obscenity conviction. But, as a
practical matter, this possibility would be measured by standards in New York, Los
Angeles and Las Vegas, thus allowing a national distributor to send material accepta-
ble in those places anywhere he chose, with little risk of a conviction for distributing
obscene material. In other words, with national standards governing the determination
of obscenity, the standard gravitates toward the top of the permissiveness ladder
instead of somewhere in the middle.
1 See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 104-06 (1974); Paris Adult Theatre
I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 56 (1973); and the jury instruction approved in Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 490 (1957).
418 U.S. 87 (1974).
Id. at 104-05.
Id. at 100.
" 413 U.S. 49, 56 (1973).
" See also Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 121 (1973).
1975]
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It is somewhat disturbing that 12 individuals, who may or
may not represent the values of their community, and among
whom younger persons tend to be underrepresented, 21 are
charged with determining, without the aid of expert testimony,
their community's standards regarding obscenity. By placing
this question entirely within the province of the jury, the Su-
preme Court has left 12 persons with the power to suppress
material based on their own individual value systems without
any regard to what, in fact, are local community standards.
29
Moreover, it seems erroneous to say, as the Court does,3" that
this determination is no different than a jury's determination
of what a reasonable person would have done in a negligence
case. A "reasonable person" is an abstract concept, a nonexis-
tent entity, whose conduct can never be established as a factual
matter; local community standards do exist, however, and evi-
dence is available to aid in their identification .31
Nevertheless, although the use of expert testimony in as-
certaining local community standards is not only logical, but
also arguably a constitutional necessity, 32 the United States
1 In many jurisdictions potential jurors are selected from voter registration lists.
This means that all individuals under 18 automatically are excluded from jury service,
and as a practical matter, the probability of younger members of the community
serving on juries is relatively low vis-a-vis the average adult, given the reluctance of
younger persons to register to vote. It is noteworthy that in Hamling v. United States,
418 U.S. 87, 135-38 (1974) the United States Supreme Court approved a jury-selection
plan under which persons under 24 were excluded from jury service because the juror
pool for the 1971 trial was taken from 1968 voter registration lists, when the legal age
of registration was 21.
2' As early as Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), this distinct possibility
of interference with first amendment freedoms led Mr. Justice Harlan to comment:
"Many juries might find that Joyce's Ulysses or Bocaccio's Decameron was obscene,
and yet the conviction of a defendant for selling either book would raise, for me, the
gravest constitutional problems . . . ." 354 U.S. at 498 (Harlan, J., concurring).
3 Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 104-05 (1974).
31 See text accompanying notes 39-52 infra. It is unsatisfactory to argue that under
Roth v. United States the jury was permitted to find and apply community standards
without the aid of external testimony. Although this is true, the basic difference be-
tween the decision made under Roth-Memoirs and the determination now made under
Miller is that under Miller the jury can apply local community standards instead of
national standards. This difference has the practical effect of precluding Supreme
Court review. See note 21 supra.
'2 The Supreme Court of California held in In re Gianini, 446 P.2d 535, 72 Cal.
Rptr. 655 (1968) that it was necessary to show by expert testimony that the questioned
material or conduct affronted the standards of the community. The court based its
decision on the availability of such testimony, and, more importantly, on the threat
19751 KENTUCKY LAW SURVEY
Supreme Court has never demanded such evidence. 3 However,
in Kaplan v. California34 the Court, citing Justice Frankfurter's
concurring opinion in Smith v. California,35 did hold that "the
defense should be free to introduce appropriate expert testi-
mony."36 Such testimony could include information regarding
local community standards.37 Following this lead, the Ken-
tucky Court of Appeals in Keene v. Commonwealth clearly
indicated that expert testimony concerning community stan-
dards could be introduced, subject to the discretion of the trial
judge.
3 1
Given these pronouncements by the Supreme Court and
the Kentucky Court that expert testimony is admissible to
establish community standards, it seems advisable to survey
to first amendment freedoms posed by having juries decide what constitutes obscenity
without the aid of evidence tending to establish the appropriate standard. This posi-
tion has been adopted in several other cases. See, e.g., United States v. Klaw, 350 F.2d
155, 167 (2d Cir. 1965); Dunn v. Maryland State Bd. of Censors, 213 A.2d 751 (Md.
1965). See also Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 165 (1959), in which Justice Frank-
furter stated in a concurring opinion:
ITlo exclude such expert testimony is in effect to exclude as irrelevant
evidence that goes to the very essence of the defense and therefore to the
constitutional safeguards of due process ....
There is no external measuring rod for obscenity. Neither, on the other
hand, is its ascertainment a merely subjective reflection of the taste or moral
outlook of individual jurors or individual judges. Since the law through its
functionaries is "applying contemporary community standards," in deter-
mining what constitutes obscenity [citation omitted], it surely must be
deemed rational, and therefore relevant to the issue of obscenity, to allow
light to be shed on what those "contemporary community standards" are.
Their interpretation ought not to depend solely on the necessarily limited,
hit-or-miss, subjective view of what they are believed to be by the individual
juror or judge. It bears repetition that the determination of obscenity is for
the juror or judge not on the basis of his personal upbringing or restricted
reflection or particular experience of life, but on the basis of "contemporary
community standards."
3 See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 100 (1974); Paris Adult Theatre I
v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 56 (1973); Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 121 (1973).
34 413 U.S. 115 (1973).
- 361 U.S. 147, 160-67 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
11 413 U.S. at 121. See also Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 124-27 (1974).
37 As to the use of experts generally in obscenity cases, See McGaffey, A Realistic
Look at Expert Witnesses in Obscenity Cases, 69 Nw. U.L. REV. 218 (1974); Note, The
Use of Expert Testimony in Obscenity Litigation, 1965 Wisc. L. REv. 113; Comment,
Expert Testimony in Obscenity Cases, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 161 (1966). See also MODEL
PENAL CODE § 251.4(4) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
3 516 S.W.2d 852, 855 (Ky. 1974).
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the types of expert testimony which have been utilized in ob-
scenity cases. 9 It should be noted at this point that it is usually
the defense which attempts to establish community standards
by expert testimony or other evidence, the prosecution usually
being satisfied with the introduction of the allegedly obscene
material itself.4 °
The most specific, concise and empirically based evidence
of community standards would probably be a community sur-
vey or public opinion poll. In Hamling v. United States" the
defendant sought to introduce the testimony of a witness who
had conducted a survey of community standards in the San
Diego, California area. 2 The trial court excluded the testi-
mony, but did so on the ground that the survey did not repre-
sent national standards. Although the Supreme Court had held
in Miller that local standards should be controlling, it refused
to reverse the petitioner's conviction because it considered any
error committed by refusing to admit the testimony to be
harmless, since the trial judge had allowed four other expert
witnesses to testify for the defense."3 In any event, the survey
offered in Hamling exemplifies the kind of expert evidence
which probably would be most persuasive in establishing com-
munity standards."
31 Expert testimony can be utilized in obscenity trials for purposes other than
establishing community standards (e.g., to show that the material either does or does
not appeal to the prurient interest). See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 127-
28 (1974); In re Giannini, 446 P.2d 535, 72 Cal. Rptr. 655 (1968); State v. Scope, 86
A.2d 154 (Del. 1952).
11 But see Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 31 n.12 (1973), in which the Supreme
Court upheld the admissibility of testimony regarding community standards offered
by a police officer called by the prosecution. The officer had many years of experience
with obscenity cases, had conducted an extensive statewide survey, and had given
expert evidence on 26 occasions in the year prior to the trial. See also United States v.
Hamling, 481 F,2d 307, 317-18 (9th Cir. 1973), in which the government also introduced
expert testimony.
" 418 U.S. 87 (1974).
42 The witness, Miss Carlsen, was a student at San Diego State University. She
had undertaken a "Special Studies" course with her journalism professor, Mr. Haber-
stroh, who was also offered as an expert witness. Carlsen had circulated through the
San Diego area asking various persons at random whether they thought "adults should
be able to buy and view this book and material." 418 U.S. at 108-09 n.10.
418 U.S. at 108-10.
" See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 31 n.12 (1973), in which the Supreme
Court upheld the admissibility of the testimony of a police officer regarding com-
munity standards based on an extensive statewide survey he had conducted.
[Vol. 64
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Another effective type of expert evidence regarding com-
munity standards is testimony concerning sales or the general
availability in the community of materials similar to those
which are allegedly obscene. The courts clearly have been more
willing to permit the introduction of such expert testimony
than to admit into evidence the similar material itself. In
Hamling the petitioner sought to introduce three categories of
allegedly comparable materials which he argued were relevant
to community standards. The trial judge excluded all three,
and the Court of Appeals affirmed." Petitioners first attempted
to introduce publications which were openly available on com-
munity newsstands. The Supreme Court affirmed exclusion of
the publications, indicating that the availability and sales of
such similar materials do not make them "witnesses of vir-
tue"46 which establish that the challenged publication is not
obscene. However, the Court did not object to the introduction
at trial of expert testimony regarding the availability of similar
materials. The Court's rationale for allowing the expert testi-
mony and refusing to sanction the introduction of the materials
themselves was apparently that expert testimony would be less
likely to confuse the jury.47 It evidently believed that if similar
material were introduced into evidence, the jury would fail to
focus exclusively on the challenged publication in deciding the
obscenity issue.
The District Court in Hamling also refused the petitioner's
offer of a magazine which had received a second class mailing
privilege. In upholding this refusal, the Supreme Court indi-
cated that although federal law provided certain standards for
the issuance of a second-class mailing permit, these standards
give postal inspectors no power of censorship, and thus, "the
mere fact that a publication has acquired a second class mail-
ing privilege does not create any assumption that it is not ob-
scene."" Lastly, the petitioner unsuccessfully attempted to in-
troduce allegedly comparable materials, a film and two maga-
zines, which the Supreme Court itself had held were not ob-
Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 125 (1974).
Id. at 126.
47 Id. at 125-27.
" Id. at 126.
19751
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scene. In upholding the District Court's refusal to admit this
material, the Court merely stated that a judicial determination
that other materials are not obscene is not necessarily relevant
to a determination of the obscenity of the material in ques-
tion.49 Thus the refusal of the Supreme Court to mandate the
admissibility of similar materials in an obscenity trial, while
permitting expert testimony regarding such material, points
out the importance of expert testimony on the question of com-
munity standards, as well as the most advisable approach for
attorneys to follow."
A good example of a case in which experts were utilized to
supply information on the acceptance of sexually explicit ma-
terial is Grove Press, Inc. v. Christenberry, in which the chal-
lenged publication was Lady Chatterley's Lover. In Grove
Press literary critics Malcolm Cowley and Alfred Kazin, in
addition to giving testimony on the literary stature of the work
and its author D. H. Lawrence, testified as to the contemporary
acceptance of literature dealing with sex and sex relations. In
addition to literary critics, publishers and retailers can be uti-
lized to testify to dissemination and sales in particular locali-
ties, thereby establishing community acceptance. This points
out a most effective use of expert witnesses, for it would seem
to be rather conclusive on the question of local community
standards if publishers or retailers could testify to significant
sales of the particular publication, or similar materials, in the
community. It may be necessary to focus on the dissemination
and sale of similar materials if the particular work in question
has recently been introduced to the locality or has not sold well
for some reason unrelated to community standards. In fact,
testimony concerning sales of similar materials, as well as the
challenged publication, would tend to give a more accurate
picture of community attitudes.
Other than the type of expert testimony already men-
' Id. at 126-27.
That the district court in Hamling refused to allow similar materials to be
introduced and that this refusal was affirmed by both the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court, does not necessarily mean that state court trial judges will refuse to
allow the introduction of such similar material.
51 276 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1960).
[Vol. 64
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tioned, McCauley v. Tropic of Cancer 2 illustrates the various
types of experts who may be competent to testify in obscenity
cases. In McCauley the trial court's finding that the book
Tropic of Cancer was obscene was reversed by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court. The case is of interest here because a total of
nine experts testified during the course of the trial. The defen-
dants, who included the book's author, Henry Miller, as well
as the publisher and the national distributor, called four
experts: Two English professors, a psychology professor, and a
reference librarian, all from the University of Wisconsin. The
district attorney presented five experts: (1) A rabbi with a doc-
torate in Hebrew literature, who had been affiliated with a
Milwaukee synagogue for 24 years; (2) the past director of the
Milwaukee Bureau of Jewish Education; (3) a Catholic priest
who taught literature and English at Marquette University in
Milwaukee; (4) the deputy chief probation officer for the Mil-
waukee County Adult Probation Department; and (5) the sen-
ior pastor of the Ascension Lutheran Church in Milwaukee.
Although this gives some indication of the range of experts who
may be called to testify in an obscenity trial, the qualifications
of some of these witnesses are questionable; not all trial judges
are likely to be as liberal on the use of experts as was the judge
in McCauley.
C. Seizure
One of the arguments pressed most vigorously in Keene v.
Commonwealth53 was that the film should have been excluded
from evidence because its seizure violated the fourth and four-
teenth amendments. A neutral magistrate, upon viewing a
public showing of the film, issued a warrant to a police officer
authorizing him to seize it as evidence of a violation of the
obscenity statute. The Court of Appeals, in rejecting the appel-
lant's contention, held that this procedure was fully consistent
with recent Supreme Court decisions dealing with the seizure
of allegedly obscene material. 4 In Roaden v. Kentucky"5 a
52 121 N.W.2d 545 (Wis. 1963).
"1 516 S.W.2d 852 (Ky. 1974).
' Id. at 854.
413 U.S. 496 (1973).
1975]
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county sheriff made a warrantless arrest and seizure after view-
ing a film at a public showing. The Supreme Court held the
seizure to be unlawful, indicating that when first amendment
values are involved, fourth amendment "reasonableness" be-
comes a stricter standard; thus, a warrant was required in order
to seize allegedly obscene material." The sufficiency of the
warrant issuing procedure was examined in Heller v. New
York,"7 decided the same day as Roaden. In Heller a criminal
court judge attended a public showing of a film and then issued
a search warrant authorizing its seizure. The Supreme Court
upheld this procedure, indicating that a determination of prob-
able cause on the obscenity question by an independent judi-
cial officer is sufficient, and that an adversary hearing prior to
seizure is not required. The Court did provide, however, that:
"[O]n a showing to the trial court that other copies of the film
are not available to the exhibitor, the court should permit the
seized film to be copied so that showing can be continued pend-
ing a judicial determination of the obscenity issue in an adver-
sary proceeding."" Since the procedure followed in Keene
clearly comported with that upheld by the Supreme Court in
Heller, the appellant's fourth amendment argument was re-
jected."
The appellant in Keene also argued that the warrant had
been improperly issued because the magistrate who had viewed
the film had failed to "focus searchingly on the question of
obscenity," as required by Heller." Although the Supreme
Court has not defined this phrase, the Court of Appeals ob-
served that this requirement clearly is satisfied6' when, as here,
the challenged material constitutes hard core pornography. 2
Given the fact that the standard for the issuance of a warrant
is probable cause, a standard less than guilt, it would appear
that the requirement that the magistrate "focus searchingly on
the question of obscenity" would be satisfied in cases other
11 Id. at 504-05. See Crecelius v. Commonwealth, 502 S.W.2d 89 (Ky. 1973)(citing
Roaden).
413 U.S. 483 (1973).
Id. at 488-94.
' Id. at 492-93.
10 Id. at 489. See also Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 731-33 (1961).
1, Keene v. Commonwealth, 516 S.W.2d 852, 854 (Ky. 1974).
12 See note 15 supra.
[Vol. 64
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than those involving obviously hard core pornography. How-
ever, in reaching a determination of probable cause on the
obscenity issue, it is important that the judicial officer keep in
mind the legal definition of obscenity, as well as his own values,
in order to satisfy the "focus searchingly" requirement and to
avoid interference with constitutionally protected expression.
Where the seized material does not clearly fall within the "hard
core" category, the prosecution will have a more difficult time
establishing that the magistrate focused searchingly on the




Intoxication as a defense to criminal conduct has never
received much sympathy from the courts; it has often been
said, in fact, that voluntary intoxication is no excuse for crimi-
nality. 3 However, this broad statement refers only to the re-
moval of inhibitions and loss of self-control normally associated
with the use of alcohol. In most jurisdictions, gross intoxication
will serve to exculpate the defendant or reduce the degree of the
crime if the defendant was so extremely intoxicated that he did
not possess the requisite mental element for the offense
charged. 4 In such cases, the courts generally have drawn a
distinction between the amorphous common law psychological
concepts of "specific" and "general" intent, allowing evidence
of intoxication to disprove the former but not the latter. 5 For
example, voluntary intoxication can reduce first degree murder
c See, e.g., State v. French, 172 N.E.2d 613 (Ohio), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 97
(1961); People v. Burkhart, 297 P. 11 (Cal. 1931); Abbot v. Commonwealth, 28 S.W.2d
486 (Ky. 1930).
cl See, e.g., Allen v. United States, 239 F.2d 172 (6th Cir. 1956); People v. Freed-
man, 123 N.E.2d 317 (Ill. 1954); Long v. Commonwealth, 262 S.W.2d 809 (Ky. 1953);
KRS § 501.080(a); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53A-7(1975); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3208(2)
(1974); Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 939.42 (1958). See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08(1).
The theory underlying this distinction may be based on the fact that crimes
requiring only general intent can be committed recklessly (e.g., murder in the second
degree, destruction of property, rape when there is a mistake as to consent). Intoxica-
tion is not a defense to recklessness, even though the definition of "recklessness"
includes an awareness of the risk created which presumably could be negated by
intoxication. See Paulsen, Intoxication as a Defense to Crime, 1961 U. ILL. L.F. 1.
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to second degree murder if it rendered the defendant incapable
of premeditation and deliberation, whereas intoxication cannot
reduce the crime below murder in the second degree. 6 This is
because premeditation is viewed as a mental state requiring
specific intent, while intentional killing with malice afore-
thought is held to require only general intent. Likewise, if a
court views rape as requiring only a general criminal intent,
intoxication is not allowed as a defense.67 But in a theft case,
in which the essential mental element is a specific intent to
steal, the defense of intoxication can result in a complete
acquittal. 8
The policy implicit in the distinction between specific and
general intent, as it relates to an intoxication defense, is that
while voluntary intoxication should not completely exculpate
a criminal defendant, neither should such an individual be
treated the same as a sober offender. 9 Under the new Kentucky
Penal Code the view persists that a person should not escape
the consequences of criminal conduct committed while he was
voluntarily intoxicated.70
B. Kentucky Law Prior to the New Penal Code
Kentucky decisions, like those of most jurisdictions, allow
gross intoxication to operate as a defense to crime. However,
instead of the usual rule that intoxication must have prevented
formation of the necessary mental state, Kentucky has articu-
lated the defense of intoxication in terms of the insanity rule.
Thus, in Kentucky, intoxication has served as a defense only
if the defendant was so drunk that he was unable to distinguish
between right and wrong." As the Court of Appeals stated the
11 See, e.g., People v. Isby, 186 P.2d 405 (Cal. 1947); Martinez v. People, 235 P.2d
810 (Colo. 1951); State ex rel. Goepel v. Kelly, 68 So.2d 351 (Fla. 1953).
' See Askew v. State, 118 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 1960).
" See State v. Estralla, 133 N.W.2d 97 (Iowa 1965)(shoplifting); State v. Roybal,
349 P.2d 332 (N.M. 1960)(larceny); State v. Reposa, 206 A.2d 213 (R.I. 1965)(robbery).
11 See Hall, Intoxication and Criminal Responsibility, 57 HAtv. L. REv. 1045, 1054
(1944).
71 See KRS § 501.020(3). The statutory definition of "wantonly" requires that the
defendant consciously disregard a substantial and unjustifiable risk. Although this
"conscious disregard" could presumably be negated by intoxication, the last sentence
of the definition provides: "A person who creates such a risk but is unaware thereof
solely by reason of voluntary intoxication also acts wantonly with respect thereto."
" See Richards v. Commonwealth, 517 S.W.2d 237 (Ky. 1974); Tate v. Common-
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rule in Richards v. Commonwealth,12 intoxication ". . has no
defensive effect unless the intoxication is so complete and of
such an advanced degree as to totally deprive the defendant of
his reason and to render him incapable of knowing right from
wrong. .... ,,1
In most cases, inability to formulate the requisite intent
and inability to distinguish between right and wrong will be
essentially equivalent mental states. When a person is so intox-
icated that he does not know what he is doing or cannot recall
his actions, not only will he not have the necessary criminal
intent, he will likewise not have known the difference between
right and wrong with respect to the circumstances surrounding
the criminal act. Nevertheless, it is theoretically possible for
the right-wrong standard to exculpate an intoxicated individ-
ual who possessed the necessary intent to commit the criminal
act, but who did not know that the act was wrong. 4 This possi-
bility indicates that the Kentucky Court of Appeals may have
confused the defense of voluntary intoxication with that of in-
voluntary intoxication which most jurisdictions articulate in
terms of the insanity defense."5
Regardless of the possibility of differing results under the
right-wrong formulation, the Court of Appeals appears to have
administered the intoxication defense so as to make it consis-
tent with the rule in effect in most jurisdictions. The Court has
required that the jury be instructed on the effect of intoxication
only when the defendant testifies that because of intoxication
he has no recollection or consciousness of the events surround-
ing the criminal act. Thus, in Allen v. Commonwealth6 the
wealth, 80 S.W.2d 817 (Ky. 1935). Interestingly enough, the Court of Appeals retained
its "right versus wrong" rule for intoxication, even after that rule was abandoned in
insanity cases in favor of the Model Penal Code's "substantial capacity" test. See
Terry v. Commonwealth, 371 S.W.2d 862, 865 (Ky. 1963).
n 517 S.W.2d 237 (Ky. 1974).
" Id. at 241 quoting Tate v. Commonwealth, 80 S.W.2d 817, 821 (Ky. 1935).
7 For example, a person could mistakenly believe, due to gross intoxication, that
he was defending himself from an attack. Although such a person clearly intends to
kill, he is not aware that his act is wrong, because he believes he is acting in self-
defense.
75 See People v. Penman, 110 N.E. 894 (Ill. 1915); Choate v. State, 197 P. 1060
(Okla. 1921); KRS § 501.080(b).
" 125 S.W.2d 1013 (Ky. 1939).
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defendant, who was charged with breaking into a depot in Har-
lan, Kentucky, testified that although he remembered being at
the depot drinking, he had no recollection of what happened
until he awoke in jail the following morning. In view of this
testimony, the Court of Appeals held that the jury should have
been given an instruction on drunkenness as a possible defense
to the charge of housebreaking. Likewise, in Hall v.
Commonwealth7 the Court held that the trial judge correctly
gave an instruction on the effect of drunkenness where the
defendant testified, in defense to the charge of storehouse
breaking, that he fell asleep in a car about an hour or two before
the warehouse was entered, and that when he awoke he was in
police custody with no memory of what had happened. The
defendant concluded his testimony by stating: "[1]t was all
like a dream to me.
' 78
The significance of these cases becomes apparent from an
examination of decisions in which the Kentucky Court of Ap-
peals has upheld the trial court's refusal to give an instruction
on intoxication. In Brennon v. Commonwealth7 a defendant
charged with grand larceny for auto theft testified that when
he and his companions took the vehicle they merely intended
to take a ride. However, he testified on cross-examination that
they intended to go to Louisville where one of his companions
had relatives. He further stated that after arriving in Louisville
they proceeded toward Owensboro, Kentucky, where they in-
tended to leave the car, but they never arrived because the car
ran out of gasoline. In upholding the trial judge's failure to
instruct on the effect of drunkenness, the Court of Appeals
noted that this testimony affirmatively established that Bren-
non was not so incapacitated by alcohol as to be unable to form
the intent to steal." Similarly, in Hayes v. Commonwealth,'
the Court upheld the trial court's refusal to give an instruction
on intoxication because the defendant's testimony concerning
his actions while drunk indicated that he had the presence of
mind to know what he was doing. Finally, in Tate v.
221 S.W.2d 652 (Ky. 1949).
Is Id. at 653.
79 185 S.W. 489 (Ky. 1916).
Id. at 492.
,188 S.W. 415 (Ky. 1916).
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Commonwealth, 2 a murder case, the Court of Appeals refused
to require an instruction on intoxication because the defendant
not only failed to state that drunkenness had deprived him of
his power to distinguish right from wrong, but also recounted
every fact that occured on the night of the killing with suffi-
cient lucidity to establish that he was not so incapacitated by
alcohol as to be entitled to an instruction on its *effect as a
defense.
A comparison of the Allen and Hall cases with the deci-
sions in Brennon, Hayes and Tate demonstrates that the Ken-
tucky Court of Appeals has construed the defense of intoxica-
tion to be applicable only when the defendant is so grossly
intoxicated that he has no consciousness or recollection of what
transpired. Applying the right-wrong standard in this way ren-
ders it fully consistent with the rule in other jurisdictions which
permits intoxication to operate defensively only if alcohol made
it impossible for the defendant to possess the mental state
necessary for the crime charged.
It is instructive to look at one other atypical result under
Kentucky law prior to the adoption of the new Penal Code.
Since Kentucky has never divided the crime of murder into
degrees,83 intoxication has been allowed to reduce murder to
voluntary manslaughter under the rationale that drunkenness
negates malice.84 In contrast, most jurisdictions divide murder
into two degrees, and do not permit intoxication to reduce the
crime below murder in the second degree.85 The Kentucky
Court of Appeals recently had an opportunity to review this
rule in Richards v. Commonwealth,"8 where the defendant
claimed that the trial court should have given an instruction
on voluntary manslaughter on the basis of evidence tending to
prove that he was intoxicated at the time of the crime. The
Court held that, absent evidence of provocation and heat of
passion, intoxication alone was not sufficient to require an in-
struction on voluntary manslaughter. However, the Court did
80 S.W.2d 817 (Ky. 1935).
See Ky. Acrs ch. 90, §§ 1, 2 (1962), as amended KRS § 507.020 (1975).
See, e.g., Geary v. Commonwealth, 503 S.W.2d 505 (Ky. 1972); Lee v. Common-
wealth, 329 S.W.2d 57 (Ky. 1959); Vance v. Commonwealth, 72 S.W.2d 43 (Ky. 1934).
See note 66 supra.




indicate that intoxication was available as a defense to murder
if there was sufficient evidence to support the instruction."s
This is especially interesting for comparative purposes, since
under the new Penal Code intoxication appears to have been
eliminated as a defense to homicide.
C. The New Kentucky Penal Code
Under the new Penal Code, which became effective Janu-
ary 1, 1975, Kentucky law with respect to the defense of intoxi-
cation has become consistent with the rule in other jurisdic-
tions. Kentucky Revised Statutes § 501.080 [hereinafter
KRS] provides that voluntary intoxication is a defense to a
criminal charge when it negates the existence of an element of
the offense89 - the relevant element being the mental state
contained in the definition of the crime. This provision has the
effect of completely exculpating the defendant if he can estab-
lish that he was intoxicated to such a degree that he could not
have formed the requisite mental state. For example, under the
new Code, burglary in all degrees requires that the defendant
"knowingly" enter or remain unlawfully in a dwelling or build-
ing.9" KRS § 501.020(2) defines "knowingly" in the following
manner: "A person acts knowingly with respect to conduct or
to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense
when he is aware that his conduct is of that nature or that the
circumstance exists." As a result, when an individual is so
intoxicated that he cannot act "knowingly," he cannot be
found guilty of burglary. Similarly, the offenses of arson, 91
" Id. at 241. The Court failed to mention the legal effect of intoxication with
respect to a "depraved heart" murder (see Hill v. Commonwealth, 40 S.W.2d 261 (Ky.
1931), involuntary manslaughter or negligent homicide. Since these crimes do not
require an intent to kill which could be negated by intoxication, the defendant could
presumably still be convicted of one of these offenses. Even though both "depraved
heart" murder and involuntary manslaughter require that the defendant be conscious
of the risk, most jurisdictions refuse to allow evidence of drunkenness to disprove such
consciousness. For the current Kentucky position on this issue, see the definition of
"wantonly" in KRS § 501.020(3) which provides that intoxication will not negate the
necessary consciousness of risk.
" KRS § 501.080(b) makes involuntary intoxication a defense to the same extent
that insanity operates as a defense.
KRS §§ 511.020-.040.
See KRS §§ 513.020-.040.
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theft92 and robbery9" require that a person act "intentionally."94
Because the definition of "intentionally" requires that the
actor have a "conscious objective," gross intoxication will oper-
ate as a defense to the above crimes when it prevents the actor
from possessing such a "conscious objective," thereby negating
the mental state of acting intentionally.
It seems likely that the Kentucky Court of Appeals will
continue to administer the defense of intoxication as it has in
the past, allowing the instruction only when the evidence es-
tablishes that the defendant has no recollection or conscious-
ness of the criminal act or surrounding events.95 Thus, to be
entitled to an instruction on intoxication the defendant must
prove that he was acting unconsciously and was therefore una-
ware of what he was doing. This would have the effect of negat-
ing the particular mental state necessary for the commission of
the crime.
The new Penal Code appears to make one major change
with respect to the defense of intoxication: Intoxication seems
to have been eliminated as a defense to homicide and other
crimes involving the infliction of personal injury. The crimes
of murder,96 manslaughter in the second degree9" and the three
degrees of assault98 can all be committed by a person who acts
"wantonly." Although acting "wantonly" requires the
conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk,99
2 See KRS §§ 514.030-.090.
See KRS §§ 515.020-.030.
9, KRS § 515.020.
' Recall that the Kentucky Court of Appeals has administered the former "right-
wrong" rule consistently with the general rule that intoxication is a defense only where
it negates the necessary mens rea. See text accompanying notes 76-82 supra.
1 See KRS § 507.020.
97 See KRS § 507.040. Although KRS § 507.030(1)(a), defining manslaughter in
the first degree, requires that the defendant cause a death when intending to cause
serious physical injury, this same conduct can also give rise to a murder charge under
KRS § 507.020(1)(b), when the mental state is "wanton." KRS § 507.030(1)(b) pro-
vides for a reduction from murder to manslaughter in the first degree (formerly volun-
tary manslaughter), when the defendant acts under the influence of extreme emotional
disturbance. The only other form of homicide under the Penal Code is "reckless homi-
cide," KRS § 507.050, which requires that the defendant act recklessly. Since the
definition of "recklessly" in KRS § 501.020(4) does not require that the actor "per-
ceive" the risk, there is no mental state required for the commission of this offense.
Intoxication is therefore irrelevant.
See KRS §§ 508.010-.030.
See KRS § 501.020(3).
19751
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
evidence of intoxication is irrelevant because the last sentence
of the section defining "wantonly" provides: "A person who
creates such a risk but is unaware thereof solely by reason of
voluntary intoxication also acts wantonly with respect there-
to."100
Murder,' for example, can be committed either "inten-
tionally"10 2 or by a person acting "wantonly" under "circum-
stances manifesting extreme indifference to human life."'"' Al-
though intoxication is relevant to negate the former, under the
above definition of "wantonly" it is irrelevant to the latter.
Thus, although evidence of gross intoxication can be intro-
duced to disprove an intentional homicide, the act of killing is
also indicative of "circumstances manifesting extreme indiffer-
ence to human life" under KRS § 507.020(1)(b), and intoxica-
tion cannot negate the "wanton" mental state necessary
under this alternative definition of murder. Therefore, when
the defendant is charged under KRS § 507.020(1)(b), evidence
of his intoxication should be inadmissible, and he should not
be entitled to a jury instruction on intoxication as a defense.
The counter-argument for the defense would be that anytime
the defendant appears to have acted intentionally, the crimes
dealing with unintentional conduct, which speak in terms of
risk creation, are irrelevant and inapplicable. The difficulty
with this contention is that the drunk who finds himself in the
position of having committed a homicide or having inflicted
personal injury has certainly created an extreme risk that such
injury or death would occur.
I0 d.
"' The following analysis in the text applies to all crimes that can be committed
"wantonly."
"I2 See KRS § 507.020(1)(a).
"0 KRS § 507.020(1)(b).
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